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A dialectic atheology – understanding the past, present, and future of atheism

Is there a continuity between various strands of atheism, despite all of their differences? This important question – for atheists and those who study atheism – is difficult to answer because it is not easy to see what the bluntness of the new atheists has in common with the subtlety of other philosophers of nonreligion, such as Richard Rorty or William Connolly. Instead of attempting to find a unifying theory of atheism, I have proposed, in a recent article published in Telos, that we need a dialectic theory of atheology. 

The triple movements of Hegel’s dialectic provide an avenue to wander through the various atheisms of the past without getting lost in the process. Famously characterized as the movement between thesis-antithesis-synthesis, Hegel’s dialectic is a method of thought to understand how contradictory concepts can be seen to come together when they are perceived as part of a movement between opposites. Importantly, for Hegel, this movement necessitates the combination of all of its parts. We cannot have the antithesis before having had the thesis, and we cannot have the synthesis without having had both thesis and.

In terms of the theory of atheology, we can identify three such Hegelian moments in the history of atheism – and indeed in contemporary atheist discourse. The first movement is a largely negative one, which I label ‘a-theology’. The privative a-, coming from Ancient Greek, is essential to the first step of this dialectic atheology. Atheists are first and foremost reacting to a conception of God, god or gods that they no longer find believable. This negative phase is often used as an argument against atheism. Atheism, some say, is reactive, negative, and destructive. It took a long time to claim the label, the epithet of accusation that for so long was attached to the word ‘atheist’. This is why I like to pinpoint the birth of atheism with the discovery of Jean Meslier’s Memoirs, in 1729, after his death. In this book, the Catholic priest from Champagne, for the first time in Western history, claimed to be an atheist. The negation is affirmed and embraced. And this is a good thing. This negative phase is necessary, not only historically, but perhaps for every atheist. There are moments when one needs to say ‘no’ to the demands imposed by certain conceptions of God. But of course, many of the bluntest critiques of the New Atheists remain solely within this phase, without seeing that there are two more steps to an atheology worthy of the name. 

What is a potential positive side of this atheology? Atheology can also be described as an atheo-logy, as the antithesis to the a-theology described above. This atheo-logy is a systematic understanding of the fight against particular understandings of God. The focus, I argue in the article, is between those who recognize atheism as a belief, and those who do not. Other commentators in this blog, notably Stephen LeDrew (​http:​/​​/​blog.nsrn.net​/​2014​/​03​/​21​/​atheists-are-believers​/​​), have argued this line well. Atheism is a belief, of the same order that religious belief is a belief. It does not rest on sufficiently firm scientific evidence to claim to be otherwise. But there are various ways to understand belief. In Ancient Greek, the terms pistis and doxa highlight two very different concepts of belief. Pistis, closer to our understanding of the term ‘faith’, is something that atheists have often reacted against. But doxa, as a form of ‘opinion’, or simply ‘belief’, is much more subtle. It is knowledge of inexact things, for Aristotle. We can still have true beliefs, but the level of knowledge we have of them is appropriate to their nature. In other words, any discussion of the nature of God is bound to be inexact. Spinoza’s deus sive natura (God or Nature) is just as much a possibility as Meslier’s ‘there is no God’. Both are particular doxa about the nature of God, both have been accused of atheism, but there is no objective way to differentiate between the two. Admitting that atheism is a belief – albeit one understood within a particular epistemic framework – is better than claiming the certainty of faith. A positive atheology will aim to build rhetorical – not scientific – arguments to convince that, among other competing doxa, it proposes the most convincing alternative.
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